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SUPREME COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF THE EFFECT OF
"M1ITIGATING MEASURES" IN DIsAImTY
DETERMINATIONS MUDDLES DISABILITIES WATERS:
Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc.
William B. Lovett, Jr. *
"The ADA is not a job insurance policy, but rather a congressional scheme
for correcting illegitimate inequities the disabled face.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1999, the Supreme Court changed the course of Americans with
Disabilities ("ADA") litigation with its decision in Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc.2
The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity depends on the nature and severity of the impairment, how long one has
been or is expected to be impaired, and the permanent or long-term impact of the
impairment on one's life.' Before Sutton, a court's conclusion on this issue often
hinged on how it viewed mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the
impaired individual: Courts that determined substantial limitation without
regard to the corrective effects of medication or treatment tended to find disabili-
ty more often than courts that took mitigative measures into account.'
Sutton settled the question of mitigating measures with its holding, "[T]he
effects of [mitigating] measures-both positive and negative-must be taken into
account when judging whether [an individual] is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the [ADA]."' With this pronounce-
ment, the Court swept aside regulatory guidelines promulgated by three agencies
empowered by Congress to implement the Act,8 and turned on their collective
heads the eight circuit courts that had deferred to those regulations when deter-
mining disability.7
* The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Judith Johnson's guidance and encouragement throughout the
development of this Casenote.
1. Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 E3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).
2. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). On the same day the Sutton decision was handed
down by the Court, the Court also decided Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that
in determinations of disability, courts must consider the corrective effects of mitigating measures on impair-
ments), and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that federal requirements for certain
jobs are binding on employers and that employers so bound may, without running afoul of the ADA, disqualify
an employee or applicant based on his failure to meet those requirements).
3. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (1997).
4. See infra note 72.
5. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
6. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has the authority to issue regulations to carry out the
employment provisions of Title I of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117) pursuant to § 12116. The Attorney
General has the authority to issue regulations with respect to Title II, subtitle A (§§ 12131-12134 relating to
public services) pursuant to § 12134. The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to issue regulations per-
taining to the transportation provisions of Titles II and III pursuant to § 12149(a). Each of these agencies is
also authorized to offer technical assistance regarding the provisions they administer pursuant to § 12206(c)(1).
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477-79.
7. The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits (and sometimes the Fifth)
deferred to the agency guidelines. Only the Sixth and Tenth did not. See infra Part II.E.
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Although the Supreme Court generally came to the right conclusions with this
decision, the issues it intended to settle in Sutton-whether one is substantially
limited by his impairment, and whether one regarded as substantially limited in
the major life activity of "working" is "disabled" because he is precluded from a
single job-will require further attention. The progenies of Sutton highlight the
flaws in this Supreme Court decision with their broad applications of its princi-
ples to cases outside of the narrow realm in which Sutton was meant to apply.8
Sections I and II of this Note will examine the purpose of the ADA, the
mechanics of meeting its threshold requirement of "disability," and the conflict-
ing interpretations of the Act among the circuit courts which led to the Supreme
Court's decision in Sutton. Sections III and IV will examine the courts' analyses
and dispositions of the Sutton sisters' ADA claims. Section V will look at the
Sutton decision through the eyes of courts interpreting ADA cases based on
Sutton's two holdings: (1) "[t]he effects of [corrective] measures-both positive
and negative-must be taken into account when judging whether that person is
'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act,"9
and; (2) "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working"--one must be, at a
minimum, unable to work in a broad class of jobs."0 Whether Sutton helps or
hurts those Congress intended the ADA to protect is the question this Note con-
siders in its conclusion. While it may be too soon to conclusively answer this
question, the author of this Note suggests that Sutton, with its bright-line rules
and confusing analysis, may in fact hurt more than it helps.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The ADA is a protective umbrella designed by Congress to provide equal
access and equal opportunity to qualified individuals with disabilities.11 It was
meant to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [set] standards
addressing discrimination [based on disability]; and ensure that the Federal
Government plays a central role in enforcing [these] standards ... on behalf of
individuals with disabilities."12 The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employ-
er "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.., in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
8. The Court's confusing (and rigid) restatement of its holding regarding mitigating measures-a corrected
impairment "does not 'substantially limit[ ]" a major life activity-has been quoted by Ohio, California and
Texas district courts as well as the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts. Its focus on "working" as a major life activ-
ity of last resort has been largely overlooked by the lower courts. Sutton's language on this issue seems to be
irresistible to the lower courts that find it easy to use to dismiss ADA claims brought under the "regarded as"
prong of the "disabled" definition.
9. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
10. See id. at 491 (quoting C.ER. § 1630-2(j)(3)(i)).
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 etseq. The ADA became effective on July 26, 1992. Pub. L. 101-336, § 108
("This title shall become effective 24 months after the date of enactment [July 26, 1990].")
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l)-(3).
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and privileges of employment." 3 With the passage of the ADA, Congress broad-
ened the scope of federal anti-discrimination law by extending the protections of
the Rehabilitation Act of 19731' into the private sector.
15
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under the ADA
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, one must show that he or she is
a qualified individual with a disability who was discriminated against because of
his or her disability. The threshold issue in every ADA case is whether an indi-
vidual is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.1 7 "[I]f one is not disabled,
then one is not protected from discrimination."8
"Disability," as used in the ADA means, "with respect to an individual--(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment." 9 This definition, however, pro-
vides little more than a starting point for determining whether one is disabled.
"To ascertain whether an individual meets [the ADA's] definition of disability, a
court must determine whether: (1) an individual's condition is a physical impair-
ment; (2) a claimed activity that the impairment affects is a major life activity;
and (3) the impairment substantially limits that major life activity."2
B. Consideration andAnalysis of "Major Life Activity" and
"Substantially Limits" in ADA Claims
1. "Major Life Activity"
Although the statute does not define "impairments," "major life activity," or
"substantially limited," Congress gave the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") authority to issue regulations necessary to implement the
Act.2' The EEOC's definitions of these terms22 guide courts through the disabili-
ty analysis.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal government agencies and private organiza-
tions receiving federal funding from discriminating against qualified individuals with handicaps.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (defining "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year....")
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See also Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 E3d 516, 519 (11 th Cir. 1997).
17. Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 E3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998).
18. Id.
19. 42. U.S.C. § 12102(2).
20. Michael J. Puma, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the
EEOC'S Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 123, 125 (1998) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998)).
21. Id. The EEOC's regulations are found at 29 C.ER. § 1630.
22. A physical or mental impairment is defined as
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting
one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emo-
tional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1), (2) (1997). "Substantially limits" is defined at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.20)(1)(i), (ii).
"Major life activities" are defined at 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(i).
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In the broadest sense, major life activities are "those basic activities that the
average person . . . can perform with little or no difficulty."23 They encompass
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."2 Whether an activity is
significant to a particular plaintiff is not considered by a court when determining
whether that activity is a "major life activity."2 Rather, a court looks at "whether
[an] activity is a significant one within the contemplation of the ADA... -"'
The standards by which major life activities are to be determined were exam-
ined by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott.27 In Bragdon, Randon
Bragdon, a dentist, was sued under the ADA by a patient (respondent) with
asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") who was refused treat-
ment in his office.28 Finding that HIV is an impairment from the moment of
infection29 and that HIV substantially affects the major life activity of reproduc-
tion,3" the Court held that HIV was a "disability" under § 12102(2)(A) even
though respondent's HIV infection had not progressed to the symptomatic
phase." In determining that reproduction was a major life activity, the Court
quoted the First Circuit's holding that "'[t]he plain meaning of the word 'major'
denotes comparative importance' and 'suggest[s] that the touchstone for deter-
mining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance."'3 2
"Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are," the Supreme Court
stated, "central to the life process itself."33
Even though reproduction was not listed among the named major life activities
in the regulations,34 its omission did not prevent the Court from finding it to be
such an activity.3" The regulations are merely a representative list meant to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive. 6 "[R]eproduction [cannot] be regarded as any
less important than [the listed activities] working and learning."'"
2. "Substantially Limits"
Analysis of the term "substantially limits" looks at the particular plaintiff and
must be "individualized and fact-specific" -- the substantiality of the limitation
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
24. 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(i). This list was not meant to be exhaustive, but only illustrative. See Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).
25. See Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1998).
26. Id.
27. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
28. See id. at 629. The ADA prohibits discrimination against any individual "'on the basis of disability in
the ... enjoyment of the... services... of any such place of public accommodation by any person who ...
operates [such] a place."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
29. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
30. See id. at 639-40 (stating that a woman infected with HIV imposes on both the man with whom she con-
ceives a child and the child a significant risk of infection).
31. See id. at 647.
32. Id. at 638 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1997).
33. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
34. See id. at 638-39 (citing 28 C.FR. § 41.3 l(b)(2) (1997)).
35. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 E3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 1998); Ryan v. Grae &
Rybicki, PC., 135 F.3d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1998).
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on the particular plaintiff is key to the determination of disability. The EEOC, in
its regulations, defines "substantially limits" as
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.3"
The regulations recommend that courts, when determining whether an impair-
ment substantially limits a major life activity, consider: "(i) The nature and
severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impair-
ment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment."4
3. "Substantially Limits" When "Working" Is the Major Life Activity Claimed
When the "major life activity" is "working," however, "substantially limits"
takes on a more restrictive meaning. 1 To be substantially limited in one's ability
to work, an individual must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to
the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities."42 "The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limi-
tation in the major life activity of working."'
Bolton v. Scrivner" illustrates the requirement that a plaintiff show that he or
she is unable to perform a broad spectrum of jobs before his or her ADA claim
based on "working" may succeed. Floyd Bolton alleged that Scrivner, his
39. 29 CER. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1997).
40. Id. at § 1630.20)(2).
41. Although listed as a major life activity in 29 CER. § 1630.2(i), the EEOC advises courts to consider the
major life activity of "working," only "[i]f an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other
major life activity, the individual's ability to perform the major life activity of working should be considered. If
an individual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no determination should be made as to
whether the individual is substantially limited in working." Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 n.
10 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting 29 CER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998)).
42. 29 CER. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The Regulations list additional factors that may be considered in determin-
ing whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; (B) The job from which
the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs uti-
lizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the
individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or (C) The job from
which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of
jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from
which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various
classes).
Id. at § 1630.26j)(3)(ii)(A)-(C).
43. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
44. Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 E3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994).
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employer, discriminated against him in violation of the ADA.4" The district court
found that, although there was evidence that Bolton's impairment prevented him
from performing his job, he was not substantially limited in the major life activi-
ty of working.4" On review of the case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's holding. 7 It found that Bolton's inability to return to his particular job
did not demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity of work-
ing.48 "'While the ... regulations define a major life activity to include working,
this does not necessarily mean working in the job of one's choice. [A]n impair-
ment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's ability to perform
only one job is not a handicap .... ","
The Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Dutcher v. Ingalls
Shipbuilding."0 Tamela Dutcher seriously injured her right arm in a gun accident
in 1989.1 In 1991, Dutcher was hired by Ingalls Shipbuilding ("Ingalls") only to
be laid-off as part of a large-scale reduction in force in May, 1992.2 When she
was recalled to work a few months later, Dutcher, at her pre-employment physi-
cal, requested that she be assigned to a job that did not require climbing because
of her impairment." The accommodation was granted, but, in light of the job
restriction, Ingalls refused to re-hire her.54 Dutcher sued Ingalls because of this
refusal, alleging that she was discriminated against by Ingalls in violation of the
ADA.
55
The district court found that Dutcher's impairment did not qualify as a "dis-
ability" under the ADA and granted summary judgment in favor of Ingalls.56 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision finding that "the inability to per-
form one aspect of a job while retaining the ability to perform the work in gener-
al does not amount to substantial limitation of the activity of working." 7 "'An
impairment that affects only a narrow range of jobs can be regarded either as not
reaching a major life activity or as not substantially limiting one."'58 Because she
45. Bolton suffered a work-related injury in 1991 and was given a medical leave of absence. See id. at 941.
According to Scrivner policy, an employee on medical leave was required to be certified by the company doctor
that he was fit to resume work before he could return to work. See id. Because the company doctor concluded
that Bolton was unable to perform the job he had performed before his injury, Scrivner refused to rehire him in
his former position. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 944.
48. See id. at 943.
49. See id. at 942. (quoting Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 E2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992)). Although Welsh
involved a claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the rule is applicable to claims brought under
the ADA. See Bolton 36 F.3d at 943. "The legislative history of the ADA indicates that 'Congress intended that
the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 'disability' as
used in the ADA."' Id. (quoting 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(g) (1998)).
50. Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 E3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995).
51. See id. at 724. To prevent deterioration in the use of her arm, she began training as a welder. Id. at 725.
She completed welding school in 1991. Id.





57. Id. at 727 (citing Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 E3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993)).
58. Dutcher, 53 E3d at 727 (quoting Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 E2d 1244, 1249 n.3 (6th Cir.
1985) (interpreting Rehabilitation Act)).
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was not prevented from performing an entire class of jobs, the court held that
Dutcher was not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. 9
In addition to protecting those who are actually disabled, the ADA also pro-
tects those who were,"0 or are regarded as, disabled. 1 Should an individual fail
to prove his or her impairment is disabling under subsection (A) of the ADA's
definition of "disabled," protection from discrimination in the workplace may
still be available through subsections (B) or (C) of the Act.62
C. "Record of" and "Regarded as" Disabled-Alternative Pleadings
Under the ADA for Those Discriminated Against
Who Are Not 'Actually" or "Presently Substantially Limited"
Section 12102(2), subsection (B) of the ADA extends protection to individuals
who have a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activi-
ty. This provision of the ADA is intended "to ensure that people are not dis-
criminated against because of a history of disability." 4 "A person ... fall[s] into
this category of disability ... if his medical records indicated he had once been
disabled, but is no longer. To prove discrimination under this section of the
statute, a plaintiff must show that his [present or prospective] employer relied on
a record showing the plaintiff's substantially limiting impairment."6 To have a
record of an impairment is, therefore, not enough; like the analysis of an actual
impairment under subsection (A), the impairment on record must also have sub-
stantially limited one or more major life activities.
Subsection (C) provides that an individual who is regarded by an employer as
having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is an individ-
ual with a disability.6 This "regarded as" definition of disability may be satis-
fied in three ways:
(1) The individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limiting
but is perceived by the employer or other covered entity as constituting a sub-
stantially limiting impairment;
(2) The individual may have an impairment which is only substantially limiting
because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or
59. Dutcher, 53 E3d at 727.
60. See 29 C.ER. § 1630, App. § 1630.2(k) (1998); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. North America, Inc., 181 E3d
1220, 1229 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (stating "The intent of [42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)], in part, is to ensure that people
are not discriminated against because of a history of disability ... ").
61. See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
third prohibition [42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)], that the employer regarded the employee as disabled, fits with the
goals of the ADA, because "[m]any such impairments are not in fact disabling but are believed to be so, and the
people having them may be denied employment or otherwise shunned as a consequence").
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). The EEOC's regulations define "record of such impairment" as meaning
that an individual "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(k).
64. 19 C.ER. 1630, App. at § 1630.2(k) (1998).
65. Sweet v. Elec. Data Sys., Inc., 1996 WL 204471 (S.D.N.Y.).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
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(3) The individual may have no impairment at all but is regarded by the employ-
er or other covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.'
The analysis of a "regarded as" claim, like the "record of" analysis, is much
the same as the analysis of a discrimination claim based on an actual impairment.
To qualify as a disability, the employer's misperception must have the same effect
as an actual impairment found to be disabling. The perceived impairment, if it
were true, must substantially limit an individual in a major life activity. Thus, all
three prongs of the ADA's disability definition have in common that the alleged
impairment-actual, historical, or perceived-must substantially limit an indi-
vidual in one or more major life activities. Unless the plaintiff succeeds in this
threshold issue-unless he proves he is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA-he may not go forward with his ADA claim.
D. The EEOC ' Role in Implementing the ADA
Since the ADA's inception, the EEOC has played an important role in its imple-
mentation. The regulations the EEOC promulgated to define and enforce the
ADA are generally given deference by courts,68 but the same deference has not
been uniformly given to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance 9 on Title I of the
ADA.7" These guidelines drafted by the EEOC and attached to the regulations as
an appendix were meant to clarify and explain the regulations with examples.
One guideline was, however, the subject of disagreement among the circuit
courts. It stated, "[T]he determination of whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices." 1
67. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879 (D. Kansas 1996); See also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(1).
68. Unless the plain language of the statute is clear, courts under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984), defer to an interpretation of the statute by the agency
authorized to enforce that statute so long as the agency's interpretation is "a permissible construction" of the
statute. A permissible construction is one that is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Id. at 844. "Chevron binds courts to an agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress requested such
an interpretation and if the resulting interpretation is reasonable." Maureen R. Walsh, What Constitutes a
"Disability'" Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Should Courts Consider Mitigating Measures?, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 917, 934 (1998).
69. 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630 (1998). Although designated "Interpretive Guidance" by the EEOC,
these interpretations of the Regulations are most often referred to as "guidelines" by the courts. This Note will
hereinafter refer to the "Interpretive Guidance" as "guideline(s)."
70. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating "while the EEOC's
[guidelines] may be entitled to some consideration in our analysis, it does not carry the force of law and is not
entitled to any special deference ....")
71. 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(0).
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E. DiscordAmong the Circuit Courts: To Defer or Not to Defer
1. Courts Deferring to the EEOC's Guideline
A majority of courts deferred to the guideline and did not consider the effects
of mitigating measures when determining whether an individual was substantial-
ly limited in a major life activity." These courts found that, because the text of
the ADA was ambiguous regarding the effect of mitigating measures, and
because the EEOC's interpretation of the statute with regard to these effects was
reasonable, the guideline should be given deference.73
The First Circuit followed this line of reasoning in Arnold v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.7 ' Arnold alleged that United Parcel Service ("UPS") refused to hire
him because of his disability, diabetes mellitus, in violation of the ADA.7" UPS
argued that Arnold was not substantially limited in one or more major life activi-
ties and moved for summary judgment.76 UPS argued that he had successfully
controlled his diabetes for twenty-three years by monitoring his blood glucose
levels and giving himself insulin injections.77 The district court, by taking into
account ameliorative medications, based its decision to grant summary judgment
to UPS on the fact that Arnold's diabetic condition did not substantially limit one
or more major life activities.7"
On appeal to the First Circuit, Arnold argued that the district court's considera-
tion of his impairment in its corrected condition was erroneous.7" Arnold further
argued that as a matter of law his condition should have been considered in its
unmedicated state." The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the lower court's
decision and reinstating Arnold's discrimination claim." In coming to this con-
clusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "the statutory language is far from
clear, particularly with respect to the key question" of mitigating measures.2
The court looked to the legislative history and the EEOC regulations and guide-
lines for clarification and found that: (1) the legislative history was clearly in
favor of disregarding mitigating measures;' and (2) the EEOC provided an inter-
pretation consistent with the legislative history, text, and broad, remedial purpos-
es of the ADA. 4
72. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. N. Y. State Bd. of
Law Exam'rs, 156 E3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 E3d 933,
937 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87
E3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 E3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996); Roth v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 57 E3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 E2d 637 (2d Cir. 1991).
73. See supra note 68.
74. Arnold, 136 E3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998).
75. See id. at 856.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 857 (stating the district court's holding that "because Arnold's diabetes was effectively con-
trolled by insulin injections, he was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA").
79. See id. at 856.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 866.
82. Id. at 858.
83. See id. at 859-60 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III at 28 (1989); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
84. SeeArnold, 136 E3d at 866.
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Harris v. H & W Contracting Co."9 presents a progression of claims and judi-
cial holdings similar to Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc."9 Ellen T. Harris
appealed entry of summary judgement in favor of H & W Contracting Company
on grounds that Harris's treated condition87 prevented her from showing that she
was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Harris appealed the decision to the
Eleventh Circuit which found that, absent mitigating measures, her medical con-
dition would substantially limit her major life activities.'
The Eleventh Circuit, like the First Circuit in Arnold, looked at the legislative
history and the EEOC's regulations and guidelines.89 The court found the
EEOC's interpretation of the statute to be "firmly rooted in the ADA's legislative
history,"9 and, citing Chevron,91 stated that, because "there is no direct conflict
between the interpretation contained in the appendix to the [EEOC's] regulations
and the language of the statute itself,"92 the guideline's directive to consider
impairments without regard to mitigating measures was permissible and should
be given deference.
2. Courts Refusing to Defer to the EEOC's Guideline
A minority of pre-Sutton courts found the EEOC guideline in direct conflict
with clear statutory requirements, and rejected the EEOC's instruction to deter-
mine disability without taking into consideration the ameliorative effects of miti-
gating measures. 3 These courts argued that the concern was "whether the
impairment affects the individual in fact, not whether it would hypothetically
affect the individual without the use of corrective measures.
94
Gilday v. Mecosta County95 is representative of the struggle courts had over
whether the EEOC's guideline was interpretive of an ambiguous statute or an
interpretation in conflict with clear statutory language requirements. Kevin
Gilday sued his employer Mecosta County, Michigan, ("Mecosta") for disability
discrimination under the ADA. 6 Gilday asserted that his diabetes was a disabili-
85. 102 E3d 516 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
86. 136 E3d 854 (lst Cir. 1998).
87. In 1973, Harris was diagnosed with active Graves' disease, an endocrine disorder affecting the thyroid
gland. See Harris, 102 E3d. at 517. The treatment of her disease had been generally successful, and her thy-
roid problems had only interfered with her work and other life activities once since the diagnosis. Id.
88. See id. at 523.
89. See id. at 520-21. The court quoted the EEOC's guideline, 29 CER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998),
which states, "The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must
be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or pros-
thetic devices." (emphasis added).
90. Harris, 102 E3d at 521.
91. See supra note 68.
92. Harris, 102 F3d at 521.
93. Three years before being fired by Mecosta (for conduct unbecoming of a paramedic and a history of
rudeness to patients and colleagues), Gilday was diagnosed with non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, a
condition he could control with medication and a strict diet and exercise regimen. See id. at 761. He blamed
his conduct on stress and periodic departures from his exercise/diet regimen that caused his blood sugar to fluc-
tuate wildly making him frustrated and irritable. See id.
94. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 E3d 893,902 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
95. 124 E3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
96. Three years before being fired by Mecosta (for conduct unbecoming of a paramedic and a history of
rudeness to patients and colleagues), Gilday was diagnosed with non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, a
condition he could control with medication and a strict diet and exercise regimen. See id. at 761. He blamed
his conduct on stress and periodic departures from his exercise/diet regimen that caused his blood sugar to fluc-
tuate wildly making him frustrated and irritable. See id.
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ty and that Mecosta should have granted his request for reasonable accommoda-
tion. 7 Had he been accommodated, he argued, his behavior would not have risen
to the level of an offense requiring termination. 8 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Mecosta holding that Gilday's diabetes did not signifi-
cantly limit a major life activity and was, therefore, not a disability.9
Gilday appealed the district court's decision to the Sixth Circuit which found
that, while "portions of the ADA's vast legislative history lend support to the
EEOC's position [on mitigating measures]," "'we do not resort to legislative his-
tory to cloud a statutory text that is clear.""'1 " "The EEOC's rule, in effect, elimi-
nates the statutory requirement that an impairment 'substantially limit[]' a major
life activity in order to constitute a disability."1 '' Judge Kennedy, writing for the
court, stated, "I do not believe that Congress intended the ADA to protect as 'dis-
abled' all individuals whose life activities would hypothetically be substantially
limited were they to stop taking medication." ' 2 When an impairment is "fully
controlled by mitigating measures and such measures do not themselves substan-
tially limit an individual's major life activities, . . . the ADA provides no protec-
tion. 103
In Pack v. K-Mart Corp.,'04 Teresita Pack sued K-Mart alleging that K-Mart
violated the ADA when it terminated her employment.0 The district court
granted K-Mart's motion for summary judgment finding that "periodic sleep
deprivation" and "the inability to concentrate" as alleged by Pack were not major
life activities." 6 "[E]ven assuming sleep and concentration are major life activi-
ties, Pack.. . 'ha[d] not demonstrated that her impairment of depression substan-
tially limit[ed] either her concentration or her ability to sleep.""'1 7
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Pack asserted that the district court erred in
"determining that sleep and concentration are not major life activities, and ... in
concluding that reasonable jurors could not find her depression substantially lim-
ited her major life activities of sleep and concentration." ' 8 The court compared
sleep and concentration to the EEOC's illustrative list of basic activities10 9 and
found that: (1) sleep is a major life activity, but (2) concentration, while "a sig-
nificant and necessary component of a major life activity," is not an "activity"
itself."0 The district court, therefore, erred in determining that sleep was not a
major life activity.
97. See id.
98. See id. Gilday argued that accommodating his condition and isolating him from stressful situations
would have prevented the very behavior that led to his dismissal-stress made him irritable and rude. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 767 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
101. Id.
02. Gilday, 124 E3d at 767.
03. Id.
104. 166 F3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. See id. at 1303. Pack alleged that K-Mart refused to accommodate her disability (which she identified
as "the inability to tolerate the stressful environment created by... a K-Mart pharmacist .... ) Id. at n. 3.
106. See id.
107. Id. (quoting App. Vol. II at 490).
108. Pack, 166 E3d at 1303.
109. See 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(i) (1997).
110. See Pack, 166 E3dat 1305.
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The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision in spite of this error."'
To be a disability under the ADA, Pack's major life activity had to be substantial-
ly limited by her impairment."' "Evaluat[ion of] whether a physical or mental
impairment is substantially limiting in a major life activity" must, the court stat-
ed, "tak[e] into consideration any mitigating or corrective measures utilized by
the individual, such as medications." '113 Because Pack's sleep problems were
"generally control[led] ... with medication," and because she failed to establish
that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of sleeping, Pack, the
court determined, was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.""
III. FACTS
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. is the story of Karen Sutton and Kimberly
Hinton ("sisters"), twin sisters who worked as pilots for a regional commuter air-
line when their court battles began. " Wanting to fly for a major airline, they
applied for pilot positions with United Airlines ("United") and were invited to
interviews in Denver, Colorado.1 Their poor vision stood between them and
their goals. 7 Applicants for pilot positions at United were required to have, at a
minimum, uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better in each eye.18 The sisters were
told at their interviews that there had been a mistake--despite their experience as
pilots and the fact that their corrected vision was 20/20, they were not qualified
to work as passenger pilots for United because their uncorrected vision did not
meet United's minimum requirement for the jobs.
11 9
A. United States District Court, District of Colorado
Believing United's reason for rejecting them to be neither legitimate nor legal,
the sisters filed a charge of disability discrimination under the ADA against
United with the EEOC.121 When they received their right to sue letter from the
EEOC, the sisters filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. 21 They alleged that United violated the ADA by rejecting them on the
basis of their "disability,"'22 or because United regarded them as being dis-
111. See id. at 1306.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
113. Pack, 166 E3d at 1305. (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 E3d 893,902 (10th Cir. 1997)).
114. See Pack, 166 E3d at 1306. The court noted that the EEOC, in its Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities
and the Americans With Disabilities Act, EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) No. 59, at E-2 n. 16 (Mar. 27,
1997), stated, "Sleeping is not substantially limited just because an individual has some trouble getting to sleep
or occasionally sleeps fitfully." Id. at n. 6.
115. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997).
116. See id.
117. Each of the sisters had uncorrected vision of 20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her
left eye. See id. With 20/200 vision, a person can see an object from 20 feet as well as a person with 20/20
vision can see from 200 feet. See id. at n. 1.
118. See id.
119. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. The sisters claimed that their poor vision was an impairment that substantially limited them in the major
life activity of seeing. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 1996 WL 588917 *2 (D. Colo.).
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abled.'23 United argued that the sisters were not disabled because they did not
have an impairment that substantially limited any major life activity.124
The district court found that, although the sisters were impaired by their poor
vision, they were not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. 2
In coming to this conclusion, the court held that impairments-not disabilities-
must be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as eyeglasses. 26
The court noted that "[nlumerous federal courts have concluded that the need for
corrective eye wear is commonplace and does not substantially limit major life
activities."' 27 Finding that the sisters had neither proved they were disabled, nor
that United regarded them as impaired in a way that substantially limited them in
a major life activity,'28 the court dismissed the sisters' civil action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the ADA.'29
B. United States Court ofAppeals for the Tenth Circuit
The sisters appealed the district court's holding to the Tenth Circuit.' They
contended that the lower court erred in dismissing their complaint and alleged
that there were
sufficient facts to establish that: (1) they were qualified applicants with a dis-
ability because they were substantially limited in the major life activity of see-
ing, and (2) United regarded them as having a substantially limiting impairment
because its policy deprive[d] them of employment throughout the global air car-
rier industry with no rational job-related basis.'
The court, they argued, erred by evaluating their impairment in its corrected state
rather than in its uncorrected state as required by EEOC guidelines.'32
In response, United contended that the sisters' vision did not constitute an
impairment within the meaning of the ADA and that, even if their vision was an
impairment, it did not substantially limit them in a major life activity'33 United
123. Seeid. at*1.
124. See id. at *2.
125. See id. at *3.
126. See id. at *5 (citing 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998)).
127. Sutton, 1996 WL 588917 at *3.
128. See id. at *6. The court stated the "proper test for a 'regarded as' claim was whether the impairment, as
perceived, would affect the individual's ability to find work across the spectrum of same or similar jobs." Id. at
*5. United did not necessarily regard the sisters as disabled simply because they found the sisters incapable of
meeting the requirements of a single job. See id. "The statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates
instead that an employer regards an employee as handicapped in his or her ability to work by finding the
employee's impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved." Id. (emphasis added).
Because the sisters' complaint was based on their inability to obtain the "single, particular job of passenger air-
line pilot with United," Id. at *4, they were not generally foreclosed from obtaining other jobs in their field.
See id. at *5.
129. See id. at *6.
130. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 130 F3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
131. Id. at 896.
132. See id. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines provide that "the determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998).
The sisters argued that this meant that the determination of whether a person has a physical impairment and is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA must be made without regard to mitigating or corrective measures.
See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 896.
133. See Sutton, 130 F3d at 896.
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argued that the EEOC's guideline relied upon by the sisters was in direct conflict
with the ADA.34 "[T]o evaluate a disability without regard to mitigating mea-
sures would," they argued, "read out the ADA's requirement that the impairment
be 'substantially' limiting."'35 United also asserted that the sisters could offer no
proof that United regarded them as "anything other than as unable to meet the
rational job-related safety requirements of the jobs sought." 3'
The court found for United on all counts holding that the EEOC's guideline
was in direct conflict with the ADA, and the sisters could neither show that their
corrected vision substantially limited their major life activity of seeing, nor that
their denial of a single job at United disqualified them from a "broad range of
jobs in various classes" as required by the "regarded as" prong of the ADA. 37
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the sisters' ADA claims
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. '38
IV INSTANT CASE
The sisters appealed the Tenth Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme
Court.'39 Because the Tenth Circuit's holding"' was in conflict with decisions by
other Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted the sisters' petition for cer-
tiorari. 4' At issue was whether corrective measures should be taken into account
when determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting.42 The sisters
argued that the guidelines issued by the EEOC should be given deference,
because the ADA did not directly address the issue.'43 The guidelines, they
argued, "specifically direct that the determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity be made without regard to mitigating
measures."'44 United maintained that a corrected impairment did not substantial-
ly limit a major life activity and that the Court should not defer to the EEOC's
guidelines because they conflicted with the plain meaning of the ADA. 4 United
further asserted that, even if the statute was ambiguous, the guidelines' directive






137. See id. at 902.
138. See id. at 906.
139. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
140. "[T]o state a prima facie case and survive United's motion to dismiss, [the sisters'] vision in its corrected
state must 'substantially limit' their major life activity of seeing. [They) cannot make this showing." Sutton,
130 E3d at 902.
141. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477 (citing Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F3d 321, 329
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding self-accommodations cannot be considered when determining a disability), cert. pend-
ing, No. 98-1285; Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 E3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding disabilities
should be determined without reference to mitigating measures); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate
Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 E3d 854, 859-66
(1st Cir. 1998) (same); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 E3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that only some impairments should be evaluated in their uncorrected state), cert. pending, No. 98-
1365.)
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Although the members of the Court were split on this issue,"4 7 the majority
agreed with United that the approach adopted by the EEOC in its guidelines was
an "impermissible interpretation of the ADA."" A person whose impairment is
"corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment," ' 9 to be sure, but
whether that person is "disabled" under the Act depends on the "effects of those
[corrective] measures." ' "[I]f a person is taking measures to correct for, or mit-
igate, a physical or mental impairment," the Court held "the effects of those mea-
sures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging
whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'dis-
abled' under the Act."'' Because the sisters' corrected vision was 20/20, and
because disability must be determined with reference to corrective measures, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts findings that the sisters had not stated a
claim that they were substantially limited in a major life activity.'
The sisters also urged the Court to find that they were regarded by United as
having a disability within the meaning of the ADA."5 3 Both United's mistaken
perception and its vision requirement,5 4 the sisters argued, substantially limited
their ability to engage in the major life activity of working, and precluded them
from a class of employment.55 United responded by arguing that because the
position of global airline pilot was not a class of jobs, the sisters had not stated a
claim that they were regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.5 6
The Court stated that "by its terms, the ADA allow[ed] employers to prefer
some physical attributes over others and to establish physical criteria."'5 7 Such
147. See id. Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented finding through study of the statute's language, structure,
basic purposes, and history that "the Act's protected class includes individuals with various medical conditions
that ordinarily are perfectly 'correctable' with medication or treatment." Id. at 501. The EEOC's interpretation
of the Act should be accorded respect because "'the agenc[y] played a pivotal role in setting [the statutory]
machinery in motion."' Id. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (brackets in
original)).
148. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. The majority found the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA impermissible
because: (1) the Act's definition of "disability" is properly read "as requiring that a person be presently-not
potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability," Id.; (2) the agency
guidelines' directive that "persons be judged in their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to
the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA," Id. at 483, and; (3) Congress's inclusion in the ADA's text of
the finding that 43 million Americans are disabled gives content to how "disability" must be defined under the
ADA. See id. at 487. "Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among
those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the
findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are
not mitigated by corrective measures." Id.
149. Id. at 483.
150. Id. at 481 (brackets in original).
151. Id.
152. See id. at488-89.
153. See id.
154. The sisters alleged that the vision requirements were based on "myth and stereotype." Id. The Court did
not explore the foundations upon which United's requirements were based. Id.
155. See id. The Court points out that the sisters did not "make the obvious argument that they [were] regard-
ed as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing," but that they only contended that they were
regarded as being substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See id. The sisters further alleged
that United's vision requirement was a substantial limitation of a major life activity (working) that precluded
them from obtaining jobs as global airline pilots (which they asserted was a "class of employment"). See id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
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requirements do not establish a claim that an employer regarded an applicant as
substantially limited in his or her ability to work.58 "'The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working."' 5 One must be, at a minimum, unable to work in a broad
class of jobs."' Because there were a number of other positions available utiliz-
ing the sisters' skills as pilots, the Court found they were not substantially limited
in the major life activity of working." The sisters, therefore, had not stated a
claim that United regarded them as having a substantially limiting impairment,
and the lower courts were correct in dismissing their case."6 2
V ANALYSIS
A. In the Wake of Sutton
A number of ADA cases decided since Sutton made it clear that the Supreme
Court's holdings based on a fairly simple case of myopia do not translate well
into more complicated factual situations. The interpretations of Sutton that fol-
low demonstrate that the lower courts may have misunderstood the narrow con-
text in which Sutton was meant to be applied. The only other explanation is that
Sutton is simply wrong.
In Taylor v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, 63 Robert Taylor, an employee
of Blue Cross Blue Shield ("BCBS") from July, 1994, until his employment was
terminated in August, 1997, filed suit against BCBS alleging discrimination in
employment on the basis of his disability, sleep apnea." BCBS filed a motion
with the court for summary judgment. 6 The court approached its decision on
the motion for summary judgment with Sutton in hand, quoting the Sutton court's
statement that "[a] person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by
medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently 'sub-
158. See id. "An employer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment decision based on a physical
or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity." Id.
Employers are free to pick and choose among "physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to
the level of an impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing voice-[that they find] ... preferable to oth-
ers, just as [employers are] free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make
individuals less than ideally suited for a job." Id. United's visual requirements, by themselves, do not establish
a subsection (C) "regarded as" claim. See id.
159. Id. at 492 (quoting 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997)) (The EEOC's guidelines state that, when referring
to the major life activity of working, one is "substantially limited" when one is "significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills and abilities.")
160. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
161. The sisters only "allege[d] that [United] regard[ed] their poor vision as precluding them from holding
positions as 'global airline pilot[s].' Because the position of global airline pilot is a single job," the Court held
that the sisters' allegation "does not support the claim that [United] regards [the sisters] as having a substantial-
ly limiting impairment." Id.
162. See id. at 494.
163. 55 F Supp. 2d 604 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
164. See id. at 607. Taylor was discharged because of his alleged poor work history, mismanagement of pro-
jects, and misrepresentations to supervisors. See id. Taylor was diagnosed with sleep apnea in the months prior
to his discharge, and blamed his poor performance on the fatigue he felt as a result of his sleep disorder. See id.
He began Constant Positive Air Pressure (CPAP) treatment in September, 1997, and, at the time this action was
instituted, no longer suffered any symptoms of sleep apnea. See id.
165. See id. at 608.
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stantially limits' a major life activity.""'1 8 Finding that Taylor's sleep apnea
"ha[d] been corrected and d[id] not substantially limit any major life activity,"
the court granted summary judgment to BCBS. 167 Taylor, the court held, did not
suffer from a disability within the meaning of the ADA."
Taylor also alleged that BCBS "perceived him as having a disorder that sub-
stantially limited one or more major life activities." '69 The court, in dismissing
Taylor's "regarded as" claim, stated that, "speculation, unsupported by any factu-
al evidence, . . . cannot defeat a motion for summary judgement."'7 ° The evi-
dence in the record indicated that BCBS discharged Taylor based on his poor
work performance, not because of a perceived disability...' "'[W]here an
employee engages in conduct that is legitimately a basis for dismissal, and the
employer believes that the employee's conduct is symptomatic of disability, the
employer may fire the employee on the basis of the conduct itself, as long as the
collateral assessment of disability plays no role in the decision to dismiss.'
1' 72
The Sutton pronouncement-that "a person whose physical or mental impair-
ment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment
that presently 'substantially limits' a major life activity"' 7q-used by the Taylor
court is finding its way into many court opinions and is being applied to situa-
tions in which the plaintiff's conditions are far more complex than the Sutton sis-
ters' poor eyesight. This language was used in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. R. J. Gallagher Co.174 to refuse plaintiff, Michael Boyle, relief
under the ADA.175 Boyle suffered from myelodysplastic syndrome, a form of
blood cancer that had been forced into remission with aggressive chemothera-
py.1
76
When Boyle, President of R. J. Gallagher Company ("Gallagher"), returned to
work, he was "immediately and aggressively" confronted by Robert Gallagher,
CEO and chairman of the board of Gallagher.1 77 Gallagher, doubtful of the true
state of Boyle's health and Boyle's ability to perform his duties as President,
reduced Boyle's salary by half and demoted him to a position far below the one
he had occupied prior to the onset of his illness. 178 Boyle's refusal to accept the
demotion resulted in his dismissal.
1 79
"Use of the predicted effects of the impairment in its untreated state for the
purposes of considering whether a major life activity has been affected by a
166. Id. at 610 (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482).
167. See Taylor, 55 E Supp. at 611.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 612.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (quoting Newberry v. East Tex. State Univ., 161 E3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998)).
173. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 481-83 (1999).
174. 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
175. See id. at 655.
176. See id. at 648-49.
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physical or mental impairment has ... " the court stated, "been foreclosed by the
recent opinion of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. .. "8
"The [Supreme] Court made clear that § 12102(2)(A) requires 'that a person be
presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited."' 18' The
court found that Boyle's condition was an impairment but because the affected
major life activity alleged was "working," his impairment in its corrected condi-
tion did not substantially limit him.182 The court reasoned that Boyle, if he chose
to, could still "access his job and all of its accoutrements .. "..'183 He was, after
all, offered continued employment at Gallagher. 84
The court in Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge,' using a broad brush to apply
Sutton, analyzed Sam Spades' depression in much the same way that Boyle's can-
cer was analyzed by the Fifth Circuit. Spades took medication and received
counseling for depression and was, by his own admission, able to "function with-
out limitation."'88 "Thus," the court stated, "his depression is corrected and can-
not substantially limit a major life activity."'87 The lower court's summary judg-
ment for the City of Walnut Ridge was, therefore, upheld by the circuit court.88
With its use of the word "cannot," the Spades court showed a basic misunder-
standing of Sutton s statement that "a person whose physical or mental impair-
ment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment
that presently 'substantially limits' a major life activity."'8 9 Not all conditions,
even though corrected to the extent pharmacologically possible, are fully cor-
rectable in a way that it can be said that they "cannot" substantially limit a major
life activity. Depression, unlike myopia, is not easily treated or fully correctable
in every case. To say that depression that has been treated is corrected and "can-
not" substantially limit a major life activity is to distort Sutton beyond recogni-
tion.
John Matuska also faced a court armed with Sutton in his suit against the town-
ship of Hinckley, Ohio, for alleged discrimination in violation of the ADA.19
Matuska suffered from depression and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome that, he
alleged, were the result of two on-the-job accidents that resulted in a lower back
180. Id. at 653.
181. Id. (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
182. See Gallagher, 181 E3d at 653-55.
183. Id. at 655.
184. The Fifth Circuit also reviewed Boyle's claim that he was "regarded as" disabled by Gallagher. See id. at
656-57. Finding that "there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Boyle was regarded as dis-
abled," the Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Gallagher and remanded it
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 657.
185. 186 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 1999).
186. Id. at 900.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-83 (1999).
190. Matuska v. Hinckley Township, 56 E Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ohio, 1999).
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injury and the amputation of a finger.191 The court, in determining whether
Matuska's impairments substantially limited him in his ability to work, would not
consider "(as suggested by Matuska) whether he would be substantially limited
in his ability to work if he discontinued his medication."1 92 Quoting Sutton, the
district court stated, "'To be sure, a person whose physical or mental impairment
is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impair-
ment is corrected it does not 'substantially limit[]' a major life activity."' 1 93
In support of its conclusion that Matuska was not substantially limited in his
ability to work and, therefore, not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, the
court stated,
When a physical or mental impairment does not prevent an individual from per-
forming any specific (or even minute) functions of one's job, then that individ-
ual cannot be found to be precluded from performing a broad class of jobs. To
find as such would eviscerate the meaning of the phrase "substantially limits."
194
The Sutton decree that the medicated condition be the starting point for substan-
tial limitation analysis, combined with the Sutton affirmation that preclusion
from a broad class of jobs is required before one is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, defeated Matuska's ADA claim. By these post-
Sutton standards, he was not disabled.
Similarly, Sorensen v. University of Utah Hospital95 involved a plaintiff with
Multiple Sclerosis ("MS") who alleged discrimination under both the "record
of" and "regarded as" definitions of "disabled." Laura Sorensen was an AirMed
Flight Nurse at the University of Utah Hospital ("Hospital") from 1991 to
1994.198 In 1993, Sorensen was diagnosed with MS and admitted to the hospital
for five days-a period in which she "was unable to perform any life activi-
ties." '197 When she was released from the hospital, her physician cleared her to
return to work, but before being allowed to return, Sorensen was told she would
have to present to management a letter from her physician stating that she was
able to return to her position as a flight nurse.198 She did, but management, still
concerned about Sorensen's ability to perform the work, compiled a list of job
191. See id. at 909. Matuska and the township of Hinckley entered into a negotiated settlement as a result of
his amputation and subsequent filing of Ohio Civil Rights Charges and Bureau of Workers' Compensation
Claim. See id. at 909-10. The township's alleged request for Matuska's resignation (in violation of the settle-
ment), Matuska claimed, aggravated his physical and mental impairments resulting in his inability to work
without accommodation of his "disabilities" by the township. See id. at 910. The township contacted
Matuska's physicians to determine how and whether he could be accommodated. See id. at 911. Because of his
severe depression and extreme disdain for the township's trustees, Matuska's physician determined he could not
be accommodated. See id. The township sent Matuska a letter demanding he return to work or be terminated.
See id. Matuska did not return to work and was fired as a consequence. See id. His ADA claim grew out of
these events.
192. Id. at 913.
193. Id. (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482).
194. Matuska, 56 E Supp. 2d at 915.
195. 194 E3d 1084 (10th Cir 1999).
196. See id. at 1085. AirMed Flight Nurses must be specially certified as a Certified Emergency Nurse and
trained in Advance Burn Life Support, as well as surgical procedures not generally required for nurses in other
hospital units. See id.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. See id.
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qualifications for her physician to review. ' Faced with the list of job conditions
Sorensen would encounter as a flight nurse, her physician withdrew his recom-
mendation that she was ready to return to her former position."'
Sorensen was seen by a second physician who also cleared her to return to
work.01 When faced with the same list of job conditions, the second physician
did not retract his recommendation that she could essentially perform the duties
required of her as a flight nurse.0 2 He could not, however, guarantee that
Sorensen would never suffer from an episode or problem associated with MS
while on duty.203
Sorensen was employed during this time as a regular nurse at the Hospital, but
resigned after several months alleging constructive discharge, because the
Hospital had neither returned her to her job as flight nurse, nor made a determi-
nation of whether she would be returned to her former position.0 4 Sorensen
brought suit against the Hospital alleging disability discrimination under the
ADA.05 The district court dismissed her claim finding that she neither had an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, nor was regarded as
substantially limited in her ability to perform a class of jobs."'
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Sorensen, like Matuska and Spades, faced a
court ready, willing and able to quote Sutton and deny relief.07 In determining
that Sorensen had not suffered discrimination because of a record of impairment,
the court found that the record of her five day hospital stay when she was sub-
stantially limited in all major life activities did not pass the "duration and long-
term impact tests"2 ' set out in the EEOC regulations and explained by the
EEOC's guidelines. 09 "Because [Sorensen's] hospitalization and MS symptoms
affected her for only a brief period of time and d[id] not presently impact her
ability to perform the job, [she] did not suffer an impairment that substantially
limit[ed] a major life activity under the ADA.
210
The court's cursory treatment of Sorensen's "regarded as" claim is more trou-
bling. Sorensen argued that the Hospital "regarded her as having an impairment
that substantially limited the major life activity of working because [it] did not
return her to her position as flight nurse. 2 1 Quoting Sutton, the court stated that






204. See id. at 1086.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1089.
208. Id. at 1087. The EEOC in its regulations, 29 CER. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1997), set out factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity. See supra Part II.D.2.
According to these Regulations, courts should consider the duration of the impairment, and the long term
impact resulting from the impairment. 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii).
209. See Sorenson,194 E3d at 1087. The guidelines state that a broken leg taking eight weeks to heal is an
impairment of brief duration. See 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20).
210. Sorenson, 194 E3d at 1087.
211. Id. at 1088.
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phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are
unable to work in a broad range of jobs."'212 The court, after finding Sutton con-
sistent with EEOC guidelines, cited an example from the guidelines in which an
individual with a minor vision impairment denied a job as a commercial pilot
would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working.213 Based
on Sutton and this EEOC pilot example, the court found that Sorensen was not
regarded as having an impairment that substantially limited the major life activity
of working." 4 She was, after all, provided numerous other opportunities to work
as a nurse, and, the court stated, "[Sorensen had] not distinguished the flight
nurse position from the class of regular nurse jobs [the Hospital] permitted her to
perform."21 As a matter of law, the Circuit Court found that Sorensen was not
disabled under either subsection (B) or (C) of the ADA.21 The court did not look
beyond the major life activity of "working" alleged by Sorensen in her com-
plaint.
B. The Effects of Sutton on Future ADA Claims
What emerges from these decisions is an affection for bright-line rules by the
lower courts coupled with either an indifference to the illegitimate inequities
faced by the disabled or an overeagerness by the courts to deny relief to all but
those most blatantly discriminated against. The Court in Sutton stated its holding
regarding mitigating measures three times: First, "Looking at the Act as a whole,
it is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a[n]..
• impairment, the effects of those measures-both positive and negative-must
be taken into account when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited'
in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act;"217 then, "[A] person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still
has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not 'substantially
limi[t]' a major life activity;" '218 and finally, "one has a disability under subsec-
tion A if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, that individual is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity."2 9 The second statement by the Court
of its holding regarding mitigating measures is distinguishable from the Court's
other statements and intent.
To say on the one hand that both the positive and negative effects of corrective
measures must be considered when determining whether one is substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity is quite different from saying that a corrected impair-
ment does not substantially limit one in a major life activity. Use of such defini-
tive language as "does not," forecloses the possibility that the corrective mea-
sures themselves may substantially limit one in a major life activity. This lan-
212. Id. (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)).
213. See Sorenson, 194 E3d at 1088-89 (citing 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2 (1998)).
214. See Sorenson, 194 F.3d at 1089.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
218. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 488.
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guage also overlooks the fact that not all conditions, though corrected to the
degree technologically and medically possible, are completely correctable. The
Court's use of this language confuses the issue.
It is, unfortunately, this very language- "if the impairment is corrected it does
not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity"-that is most often quoted by the
lower courts and that inevitably leads these courts to the conclusion that the indi-
vidual alleging disability discrimination is not, in fact, disabled. The courts
using this language have applied it to conditions as diverse as sleep apnea, can-
cer, severe depression and multiple sclerosis. While it is easy enough to find that
putting on eyeglasses fully corrects a visual acuity impairment so that it no
longer substantially limits one in a major life activity, using this same reasoning
to find that intensive psychological or medical treatment of conditions that are
much harder-even impossible-to fully correct is a misapplication of the law as
stated in Sutton.
The Court in Sutton dealt with nearsightedness-a minor impairment. In such
narrow fact situations in which it may be contemplated that impairments are eas-
ily and fully correctable without adverse affect, Sutton s second statement of its
mitigating measures holding may properly be used. Outside of these situations,
it is merely a convenient tool, easily wielded to dismiss claims that should legiti-
mately be heard by a jury. It is, in difficult and complex cases, inapplicable.
Sutton went to great lengths to bring mitigating measures into the determina-
tion of disability equation. When faced with the same opportunity with regard to
determinations of substantial limitation when "working" is the major life activity
claimed, however, the Court did little more than affirm prior decisions based on
the EEOC's guidelines. In its approach to "working," the Court in Sutton noted
that the EEOC "has suggested that working [should] be viewed as a residual life
activity, considered, as a last resort, only '[i]f an individual is not substantially
limited with respect to any other major life activity. If an individual is substan-
tially limited in any other major life activity, no determination should be made as
to whether the individual is substantially limited in working.""'22 Yet "working"
seems to be the beginning and end of judicial consideration in "regarded as"
claims since Sutton.
Perhaps this is because Sutton did not look beyond "working," even as it point-
ed out that the Sutton sisters "d[id] not make the obvious argument that they
[were] regarded due to their impairments as substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing."'221 This choice, to focus on "working"-even though "seeing"
was a major life activity that could have been claimed and that properly should
have been alleged by the Suttons-may have been influenced by the fact that
either major life activity would have brought the Court to the same conclusion.
Had the alleged major life activity in Sutton been "seeing," the fact remained that
seeing was easily and fully correctable, and the job in question was piloting com-
220. Id. at 492 (quoting 29 C.ER. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20)) (emphasis added).
221. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
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mercial passenger airliners-an area in which sight-based job requirements are
easily justified as business related. Again, this holding, while correct in the case
of the Sutton sisters, does not translate well to other contexts.
The court in Matuska v. Hinckley Township, following much the same analyti-
cal path as Sutton, focused on "working" in spite of Matuska's allegations of
depression, loss of sleep, vision problems, and loss of memory.222 By focusing
on "working," the court ignored the fact that an individual impaired in the major
life activity is more than likely impaired in other major life activities as well.
When an individual claims to have been discriminated against by an employer
that regarded him as disabled, it is hard to believe that the employer's mispercep-
tion can be isolated to the individual's ability to work. An employer that regards
an employee or an applicant as disabled will, more than likely, regard the individ-
ual as impaired in a number of major life activities.
Even if the employer did, in truth, only regard the employee/applicant as
impaired in his ability to work, courts should be reluctant to go directly to the
EEOC's recommended work-based analysis. To say at this point that a person is
not substantially limited simply because he is precluded from one job and not a
class or broad range of jobs ignores the possibility that the individual, if he were
in fact impaired as the employer regarded him to be, would probably be impaired
in more than his ability to work.
A cancer patient, for instance, who completes chemotherapy and returns to
work bald and haggard, may encounter bias or even hostility based on his
unhealthy appearance even though his doctor has given him a clean bill of health.
If he is fired or demoted because his employer regarded him as disabled, a court
considering his discrimination claim should look past the obvious allegation that
the employee was only regarded as impaired in his ability to work and avoid
hastily finding that his preclusion from one job did not substantially limit him in
the major life activity of working. If the employee were truly impaired in the
way his employer regarded him as being impaired, his abilities to function would
be substantially limited in a number of ways, possibly including seeing, hearing,
walking, breathing, sleeping, or learning. Were any of these activities substan-
tially limited, a court would not-in fact, could not-look to "working" as a sub-
stantially limited major life activity.223
Yet, following the example set by the Court in Sutton, this is exactly what the
courts in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R. J. Gallagher Co.224
and Sorensen v. University of Utah Hospital225 did. These cases involved cancer
and multiple sclerosis, respectively, and in each case, the "regarded as" analysis
began and ended with the major life activity of working. While this approach is
not the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Sutton, the language
employed by the Sutton Court with its "regarded as" analysis, makes the alleged
222. See 56 F Supp. 2d 906, 913 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
223. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) 1997).
224. 181 E3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999). See discussion supra Part VA.
225. 194 E3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1999). See discussion supra Part VA.
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major life activity of working an especially easy activity to deny. Courts armed
with quotes like, "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not con-
stitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working," '226 and, "[i]f
jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are
available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs" '227 are apparently
becoming myopic in their ability to see disability discrimination in "regarded as"
claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc., while problem-
atic, is generally correct. Mitigating measures should be taken into consideration
by courts determining whether a major life activity is substantially limited by an
impairment. To say that an individual would be disabled if he did not take medi-
cine or other available treatments for his impairment is to disregard the core
meaning of the statutory phrase "substantially limits one or more ... major life
activities." '228 "Substantially limits" requires that the impairment presently exist.
If corrective measures have mitigated the effect of the impairment to the extent
that it no longer presently substantially limits an individual, then that individual
should not be considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In this
aspect, the Court was correct, in spite of its awkward and confusing restatement
of its holding.
The Sutton Court's choice of words in its second statement of its mitigating
measures holding will almost certainly require the Court's attention in the not-so-
distant future. Because the facts of the situation in Sutton were simple, and the
impairment fully corrected in a way that many impairments may never be cor-
rected, the Court's pronouncement that corrected impairments do not substantial-
ly limit a major life activity was, perhaps, an acceptable restatement of its hold-
ing-but only in situations analogous to Sutton. Taken out of context, that is,
applying this rule-that corrected impairments do not substantially limit a major
life activity-to a situation where the corrective measures either do not fully mit-
igate the effects of the impairment or have side effects that are themselves a sub-
stantially limiting impairment, is a perversion of Sutton's intent. It can only
harm those Congress intended to help with the ADA.
The Court's handling of the Sutton sisters' "regarded as" claim and its focus on
"working" neither broke new ground nor cleared up the confusion surrounding
subsection (C) claims. Indeed, Sutton's affirmation of the EEOC's directive that
preclusion from a single job is not a substantial limitation when "working" is the
major life activity claimed, will probably force plaintiffs to rethink future
"regarded as" claims based on "working." Sutton all but closes the door on sub-
section (C) claims in which the employee was fired from or not hired for the job
of his choice. How many jobs a plaintiff must be denied before his "working"
226. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
227. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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claim succeeds remains the unanswered question. With its decision in Sutton, the
Supreme Court demonstrated that it, too, believes that "[t]he ADA is not a job
insurance policy ... ."229 Employees and the protection Congress intended the
ADA provide them will suffer needlessly at the cold-hearted hands of corporate
"Scrooges" unless and until the Supreme Court reconsiders its "regarded as"
stance.
229. Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).















